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Abstract 
 
Food policy is one the most regulated policy fields at the EU level. ‘Unholy alliances’ are 
collaborative  patterns  that  temporarily  bring  together  antagonistic  stakeholders  behind  a 
common cause. This  paper deals  with  such ‘transversal’  co-operations  between citizens’ 
groups  (NGOs,  consumers  associations…)  and  economic  stakeholders  (food  industries, 
retailers…), focusing on their ambitions and consequences. This paper builds on two case 
studies  that  enable  a  more  nuanced  view  on  the  perspectives  for  the  development  of 
transversal networks at the EU level.  
The  main  findings  are  that  (i)  the  rationale  behind  the  adoption  of  collaborative 
partnerships actually comes from a case-by-case cost/benefit analysis leading to hopes of 
improved  access  to  institutions;  (ii)  membership  of  a  collaborative  network  leads  to  a 
learning process closely linked to the network’s performance; and (iii) coalitions can have a 
better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending on several factors 
independent of the stakeholders themselves. 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
“For  the  majority  of  the  world’s  population,  food  is  not  just  an  item  of 
consumption, it is actually a way of life. It has deep material and symbolic 
power [...] because it embodies the links between nature, human survival and 
health, culture and livelihood”.
1  
 
This cultural sensitivity is translated into a high political and economic sensitivity when it 
comes to questions of food policy and governance: “one might venture to suggest that food 
is as much a force to be reckoned with as money”.
2 Food policy is defined as “the collective 
efforts of governments to influence the decision-making environment of food producers, 
food  consumers,  and  food  marketing  agents  in  order  to  further  social  objectives”.
3 This 
broad definition displays the all -encompassing nature of food politics, fro m  fishery and 
agriculture to nutrition, food safety and animal welfare.  Food trade having become “one of 
the  more  heavily  regulated  segments  of  the  [...]  economy”,
4 decision-making arenas are 
logically targeted by civil society actors to make their voices heard.  
In food policy the most vocal civil society actors are economic stakeholders and 
citizens’  groups.  While  the  former  category  includes  a  wide  range  of  interests  from 
producers  to  processors,  advertisers  and  retailers,  the  latter  category  can  be  defined  as 
“associations  [seeking]  to  secure  political  objectives  [...]  based  around  an  idea  and 
sometimes  a  single  issue,  with  no  occupational  basis  of  membership”.
5  The  often 
antagonistic relationship between these two groups can be simplified as follows: “industry 
was considered the ‘bad guy’ by the [citizens’] movement, while business had regularly 
                                                 
1 P. McMichael, ‘The power of food’, Agriculture and Human Values, Vol.17, 2000, pp.31-32. 
2 Ibid., p.21. 
3 World Bank (C. Peter Timmer, Walter P. Falcon and Scott R. Pearson),  Food Policy Analysis, Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p.10. 
4 M. T. Law, ‘The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation’, The Journal of Economic History, Vol.63, No.4, 
2003, p.1103. 
5 C. de Fouloy, The Fouloyʼs Explanatory Lobbying Dictionary, Brussels : AALEP Publishing (ADP), 2011, 
p.44.   5 
condemned  the  utopianism,  radicalism  and  amateurism  of  [citizens’]  organisations”.
6 To 
achieve their ends, these different civil society actors resort to lobbying.  
A ‘coalition’ can be described as a “purposive group of organisations united behind a 
symbiotic set of legislative or regulatory goals”
7 within which “coalition membership allows 
groups leaders to combine their resources and divide the workload”.
8 Despite a tendency to 
“round up the usual suspects”,
9 coalition-forming can also “make strange bedfellows”
10 by 
bringing together “not only like-minded organisations, but also actors representing ‘the other 
side’”
11  in  ‘transversal’  coalitions.  The  unholy  alliances  temporarily  bring  together 
antagonistic groups (especially when one is broadly perceived by the public as innocent and 
the other as more strategically-minded)
12 behind a common cause. ‘Unholy alliances’ are by 
nature ad hoc, and therefore bound to end when the common cause is achieved and former 
allies resume their feud. Applied to the field of EU food policy, the concept of ‘unholy 
alliance’ raises questions about the collaborative relationships formed between economic 
actors and citizens’ groups. Why do these two apparently antagonistic groups network and 
form coalitions? How do these actors work together? What is the added value of this creative 
form of governance for each involved actor? 
                                                 
6 B. Arts,  ‘‘Green  Alliances’  of Business and NGOs. New  styles of self-regulation of  ‘dead-end roads’?’, 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol.9, 2002, p.26. 
7 K. Hula, Lobbying Together: Interest Group Coalitions in Legislative Politics, Washington DC, Georgetown 
University Press, 1999, p.22. 
8 K.  Hula,  ‘Dolly  Goes  to  Washington:  Coalitions,  Cloning,  and  Trust’,  in:  Herrnson,  P.,  Shaiko,  R.  and 
Wilcox, C., The Interest Group Connection — Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington (2nd 
ed.), Washington DC, CQ Press, 2005, p.232. 
9 K. Hula, ‘Rounding up the usual suspects: forging interest group coalitions in Washington’, in Cigler, A.J. 
and Loomis, B. A. (edn.), Interest group politics, Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995, 4th 
edn., pp.239-258. 
10 R. Almeida, ‘Strange Bedfellows of the Usual Suspects? Spatial Models of Ideology and Interest Group 
Coalitions’, paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, April 2005, 
p.4. 
11 B. de Angelis, ‘Food Labelling & Stakeholder Network(s) — A David vs. Goliath Fight Between NGO and 
Business Interests?’, thesis under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Hrbek, R., College of Europe, Bruges, 2011, 
p.56. 
12 For instance see R. J. Higgs and M.  C. Braswell,  An Unholy Alliance: The Sacred and Modern Sports, 
Macon, Mercer University Press, 2004; D. Horowitz, Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam And The American Left, 
Washington,  Regnery  Publishing,  2004  or  K.  N.  Metzner,  ‘Retroactivity,  Habeas  Corpus,  and  the  Death 
Penalty: An Unholy Alliance’, Duke Law Journal, Vol.41, No.1, 1991, pp.160-190.   6 
The starting point of the present work consists of three hypotheses: 
  (i)  the  success  of  transversal  coalitions  in  other  policy  fields  can  link  positive 
expectations to the replication of these collaborative structures in food policy; 
  (ii) these transversal collaboration patterns generate a learning process between the 
involved actors; 
  (iii) as a result of their joint efforts, the partner groups have more influence on EU 
institutions than within ‘traditional’ alliances or on an individual basis. 
   This paper will be divided into three parts. Part 1 will present the two case studies 
used as empirical basis for the thesis: the European Platform for Action on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health, and the ‘Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Reform Alliance’. Part 2 will 
bring forward an analysis of these networks’ contributions to governance in the EU in terms 
of  increased  access  to  decision-makers,  legitimacy  and  added  value.  Part  3  will  draw 
conclusions  from  the  case  studies  concerning  the  future  developments  of  collaborative 
relationships between seemingly antagonistic groups in food policy.  
 
1. Fora of stakeholder interaction 
The European  Commission  published its  White Paper on Governance  in 2001  explicitly 
encouraging alliances between segments of civil society.
13 The EU’s civil society reacted 
with “the birth of complex multilevel and institutional advocacy coalitions, ad hoc interest 
groupings, and EU institutionally-led forums”.
14 In food policy,  what illustrations of such 
behaviour can be highlighted? 
   
                                                 
13 European  Commission,  White  Paper  —  European  Governance,  COM(2001)428  final,  Brussels,  25  July 
2001. 
14 D. Coen, ‘Environmental and Business Lobbying Alliances in Europe — Learning from Washington?’, in: 
Levy, D. L. and Newell, P. J., The Business of Global Environmental Governance, Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 2005, p.198.   7 
Permanent structures: the ‘Diet Platform’ case 
Institutionalised policy platforms are one of the solutions at the EU’s disposal to 
institutionalise civil society’s input to its decision-making processes. In Brussels, concretely, 
what are the ambitions and features of such platforms? Policy-specific platform building 
became more and more popular in the late 1990s, when the institutions as well as the private 
stakeholders  realised  the  potential  gains  of  such  solutions.
15 A policy platform can be 
defined as “a multi-stakeholder forum where members from the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors  come  together  to  share  knowledge  and  ideas,  and  discuss  their  concrete  efforts 
[towards the completion of their common objectives]”.
16 A major factor in the creation of a 
policy platform by authorities is the occurrence of a convergence of interests between 
decision-makers and private organisations that can pool their complementary res ources and 
create synergies.
17 EU policy platforms, by gradually enabling a more constructive dialogue, 
aim  at  overcoming  antagonistic  relationships  as  well  as  “facilitating  a  cross-sectoral 
approach to  the issue”.
18 Platforms can nevertheless be criticised  to the extent that their 
activities tend to focus on information-dissemination rather than decision taking:
19 the only 
outputs of such platforms are voluntary initiatives such as pledges or codes of conducts
20 that 
have been harshly criticised as insufficient.
21 
In the field of EU food policy, the concrete example of the European Platform for 
Action  on  Diet,  Physical  Activity  and  Health   (hereafter  ‘Diet  Platform’)  is  a  perfect 
illustration of those ambitions, connections and tensions. The Diet Platform was established 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p.199. 
16 European Commission, Evaluation of the European platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health 
— Final Report, Brussels, July 2010, p.2. 
17 B. Leech et. al., ‘Does Money Buy Power? Interest Group Resources and Policy Outcomes’, paper presented 
at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, April 12th-15th 2007, pp.7-8. 
18 Ibid. 
19 D. Guéguen, European Lobbying (2nd ed.), Brussels: Europolitics, 2007, p.133. 
20 B. Arts, ‘Non-state actors in global environmental governance: New arrangements beyond the state’, in: 
Koenig-Archibugi, M. and Zurn, M.,  New modes of Governance in the global system, Hamshire, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005, p.9. 
21 R. Moodie et. al., ‘Profits and pandemics: prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and  ultra-
processed food and drink industries’, The Lancet, Vol.381, No.9867, 2013, p.676.   8 
in March 2005, both as a forum for dialogue and best practice exchange and as a springboard 
for co-operation on non-regulatory initiatives  on nutrition-  and health-related issues.
22 In 
short, “the Platform aims to pool expertise and catalyse Europe-wide action across a range of 
sectors”.
23 While all members agree on the need for action against obesity , for instance, 
more disagreements arise when studying the concrete steps that need to be taken.
24  
The Diet Platform is financed and chaired by the Directorate-General for Health and 
Consumers (DG SANCO) of the Commission
25 and four times a year  gathers actors from 
consumer organisations, health NGOs, health professionals, academics, researchers, the food 
industry, retailers and advertisers.
26 The size of a delegation depends on the importance of 
the Platform’s activities for the member’s core activity, as well as the member’s contribution 
in  terms  of  voluntary  commitments  to  the  Platform.
27 DG  SANCO’s  role  is  to  steer 
stakeholders towards more cooperative approaches, encourage action-oriented commitments 
and communicate the Platform’s activities to the Council of the EU and the Parliament.
28  
The  Commission  has  full  discretion  over  the  selection  criteria  applied  to  Diet 
Platform  candidates.
29 Once  they  are  ac cepted,  members  are  obliged  to  m ake  regular 
commitments to the Platform or risk being excluded .
30 Some stakeholders, mainly not-for-
profit organisations, are not overly enthusiastic about the Diet Platform’s activities and the 
resulting workload for resource-limited actors, but they retain their membership in order to 
be included in the dialogue
31 and fulfil a ‘watchdog’ function
32. The European Organisation 
                                                 
22 M. Hallsworth and Tom Ling, The EU Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health — Second Monitoring 
Progress Report, Santa Monica, RAND Europe, 2007, p.iii. 
23 ‘The EU Platform for  Action on Diet, Physical  Activity and Health  -  An Insider’s  Perspective’, EPHA 
(European Public Health Alliance) website, September 2006. 
24 European Commission (2010), op. cit., p.25. 
25 Guéguen, op. cit., p.132. 
26 EPHA, loc. cit. 
27 Interview with M. Xipsiti, Food Drink Europe (Manager of Consumer Information, Diet and Health), 28 
February 2013, Brussels. 
28 European Commission, ‘EU Platform on Action for Diet, Physical Activity and Nutrition’ Charter, 15 March 
2005. 
29 EPHA, loc. cit. 
30 Intervention of L. Durack (DG SANCO), at the February 2013 Diet Platform Meeting. 
31 Phone interview with J. Murray (former BEUC director), 26 February 2013.   9 
of Craftsmen and Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME) has, for instance, been 
“kicked  out”  from  the  Platform  because  of  a  lack  of  activity  with  regards  to  their 
commitments.
33 This focus on action is “one of the key characteristics that differentiates the 
Platform from other multi-stakeholder forums”,
34 which has been described even by critical 
stakeholders as “a refreshing change to the rhetoric often found on similar projects”.
35 A 
corollary of this focus on action is the importance of evaluation and monitoring on the Diet 
Platform’s  agenda.
36 With the commitments representing for each actor a considerab le 
workload, “it is a struggle for everybody to find a system to evaluate their efficiency, action 
and impact”.
37 The not-for-profit members of the Diet Platform are the most critical towards 
its activities:  
“[the Diet Platform] is not going far enough or fast enough [...] policy makers 
need to identify clearly the objectives to be achieved with clear timelines and 
targets. It also needs to be made clear that if the aims are not achieved, they 
will explore the Regulatory route”.
38  
Certain NGO voices are even more vocal:  
“we joined the Platform out of worry about what its outputs would be. There 
is too much voluntary action going on, and by joining the Platform we get 
drawn into this spirit that voluntary action is not so bad in the end. I am 
shocked when the Platform is described as a “partnership”, because what it 
actually is is a time-consuming exercise of exchanging ideas. [...] NGOs need 
to keep criticising everything that is said to show there is no consensus”.
39  
These disagreements stem from a fundamental difference of what is entailed  by the 
term ‘commitment’:
40 while many commitments are not entirely new but rather upgrade d 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
32 de Angelis, op. cit., p.44. 
33 de Angelis, op. cit., p.45. 
34 European Commission (2010), op. cit., p.3. 
35 EPHA, loc. cit. 
36 European Commission (2010), loc. cit. 
37 Intervention of M. Baffigo (Chair of the FDE Diet Task Force and Kellogg Director of Public Affairs) at the 
February 2013 Diet Platform Meeting. 
38 Interview with R. Veale, BEUC (Head of food policy department), 27 February 2013, Brussels. 
39 Intervention of P. Rundall (Baby Milk Action NGO, Policy Director) at the February 2013 Diet Platform 
Meeting. 
40 European Commission (2010), op. cit., p.22.   10 
versions of existing projects,
41 it should be noted that the Platform has added value and 
ambitions to projects that would maybe not have happened otherwise.
42 Some debates can be 
very confrontational, but it is an inherent difficulty for  any multi-stakeholder platform.
43 
Stakeholders  also  emphasise  some  constructive  dialogue,  exchanges   and  instances  of 
socialisation
44 without going as far, however, as describing the Diet Platform membership in 
terms of a ‘learning process’.
45 
As an  alternative to public regulation and to  self -regulation, the Diet Platform 
exemplifies the model of  permanent  multi-stakeholder dialogue with some form of self -
government  under  public  supervision .
46  DG  SANCO’s  initiative,  chairmanship  and 
monitoring are essential in understanding the Diet Platform’s raison d’￪tre. The antagonistic 
groups within the Diet Platform often disagree, for instance on the evaluation of current 
activities. They are, however strongly encouraged to co-ordinate their actions and at least 
engage in a constructive dialogue on issues of common interest. These debates can take 
place within or even outside the Platform’s core focus, such as  the issue of food safety 
during the February 2013 meeting. Lastly, through regular Platform meetings, private actors 
can interact on a personal level, not only amongst stakeholders but also with representatives 
of the Commission from different DG and hierarchical levels. 
To conclude, the model of policy platforms is now more commonly used by the 
Commission in order to institutionalise civil society debate on areas of common concern, 
such as better nutrition and health. The Diet Platform, instigated and supervised by DG 
SANCO, gathers stakeholders from various backgrounds in a process of dialogue and action 
commitments  whose  efficiency  is  questioned  by  many  non-business  members  of  the 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p.44. 
42 Ibid., p.3. 
43 Interview with Murray. 
44 Interview with Xipsiti. 
45 Interview with Murray. 
46 K. van Kersbergen and F. van Waarden, ‘‘Governance’ as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary 
inspiration  regarding  shifts  in  governance  and  problems  of  governability,  accountability  and  legitimacy’, 
European Journal or Political Research, Vol.43, 2004, p.149.   11 
Platform.  The  Diet  Platform  is  an  example  of  a  stable,  permanent  and  institutional 
framework  of  exchange  between  stakeholders.  However,  more  innovative  models  can 
present interesting alternatives of collaborative relationships. 
Ad hoc coalitions: the ‘CFP Reform Alliance’ case 
While traditional confrontational techniques may remain relevant for some particular 
issues, the latest trend in EU lobbying is ‘transversal lobbying’,
47 meaning more ‘creative’ 
coalitions gathering traditional antagonists that together propose a consensual solution to 
decision-makers
48. Unusual coalitions catch public attention and have consequently become 
popular phenomena.
49 Such strategies are widespread in environmental policy, telecom and 
health,  but  less  so  in  food  policy .
50  ‘Green  alliances’  in  particular  –  “collaborative 
partnerships between environmental NGOs and businesses that pursue mutually beneficial 
goals”  –
51  have  attracted  much  attention.  Those  partnerships  can  take  philanthropic, 
strategic, commercial or political forms,
52 hence a variety of illustrations in recent years. To 
launch a successful partnership, however, stakeholders must overcome tensions between the 
for-profit and not-for-profit actors. The majority of businesses mistrust NGOs and their 
communication style, while simultaneously being aware of their importance in policy -
making.
53 Indeed, if NGOs used to lack technical credibility, most of them are nowadays 
treated as reliable partners by the EU institutions .
54 NGOs alone, despite public funding, 
                                                 
47 ‘Lobbying européen — Focus sur le lobbying transversal’, IE-Lobbying consultancy blog, 13 June 2007. 
48 S. Hale, ‘NGOs must form creative alliances to tackle global poverty and injustice’, The Guardian ‘Poverty 
Matters’ Blog, 14 March 2011. 
49 Arts, ‘Green Alliances’, op. cit., p.1. 
50 Interview with Murray. 
51 Arts, ‘Green Alliances’, op. cit., pp.2-3. 
52 A. J. Hoffman and S. Bertels, ‘Who is Part of the Environmental Movement? Assessing Network Linkages 
between NGOs and Corporations’, Ross School of Business Working Paper No.1125, 2009, pp.8-9. 
53 Guéguen, op. cit., p.135. 
54 ‘Lobbying européen — interview de Daniel Guéguen’, IE-Lobbying consultancy, unknown date.   12 
often lack the financial and human resources to campaign on every EU negotiation,
55 hence 
their need to open a constructive dialogue with business interests.
56  
One can observe similar mistrust towards industry .
57 Those fears are based on the 
concept  of  ‘astroturf  lobbying’  that  can  be  defined  as  a  situation  in  which  corporations 
manufacture an artificial public mobilisation, while letting it appear as a genuine grassroots 
movement.
58 NGOs are thus afraid that businesses will take advantage of their vulnerability 
to trick them into an alliance only aimed at enhancing their own public image .
59 Without 
going as far, it is common knowledge that while there may be sincere commitment from all 
sides,  there  is  an  indisputable  dose  of  ‘window-dressing’  and  image-building  in  all 
coalitions,  of  course  to  be  examined  on  a  case-by-case  basis  and  from  a  historical 
perspective.
60  
NGOs also have different  principles in relation to collaborating with businesses, to 
the extent that some speak about a “schism” between “pragmatism and purity”, meaning the 
consensus-oriented and confrontation-oriented NGOs are respectively described as “bright 
greens”  and  “dark  greens”.
61 The  World  Wide  Fund  for  Nature  ( WWF)  is  a  perfect 
illustration of the first category: while criticised by activists  for their links with businesses, 
one  of  their  representatives  answered:  “we’re  not  selling  out,  we’re  buying  in!”.
62 In 
Brussels, Greenpeace can serve as a ‘dark green’ NGO example
63 because of its “emotional 
                                                 
55 S.  Prakash  Sethi,  ‘Strategic  Alliances  Between  Business  Groups  and  Society:  It  takes  more  than  good 
intentions to succeed’, paper presented at the Waikato Management School Seminar Series, April, 8th 2008, 
p.2. 
56 ‘European NGO  Futures:  A study of Europe’s leading  NGOs and their contribution to policymaking in 
Brussels - Executive Summary’, SIGWatch, 2008. 
57 Ibid. 
58 de Fouloy, op. cit., p.31. 
59 Phone interview with T. Koltai (Association of European Coeliac Societies), 5 February 2013. 
60 Interview with R. Patten, Grayling (Director), 12 April 2013, Bruges. 
61 Hoffman and Bertels, op. cit., p.16. 
62  E.  Stafford,  M.  Polonsky  and  C.   Hartman,  ‘Environmentalist-Business  Collaboration  and  Strategic 
Bridgings:  An  Analysis  of  the  Greenpeace-Foron  Alliance’,  paper  presented  at  the  Seventh  International 
Conference of Greening of Industry Network, Rome, 15th-18th November 1998, p.8. 
63 Biliouri, op. cit., p.179.   13 
intensity and resistance to compromise”.
64 This distinction is also relevant, to a lesser extent, 
for businesses.
65 In any situation, ‘bright greens’ and pragmatic businesses interests do not 
just join their forces out of good faith, but because they have common interests: “interest-
based negotiations are a more efficient and effective way to manage differences than right 
debates or power struggles”.
66 Through these initiatives they strive to show that “we can do 
good and do well at the same time”.
67 Given that the aggregated complementary resources of 
several partners will increase their chances to reach an optimal outcome ,
68 the decision to 
join such a coalition is a question of pragmatism and opportunities .
69 Ad hoc transversal 
coalitions are focused on communication and “tend to engage in a more aggressive, single-
issue type of lobbying oriented almost exclusively on communication campaigns”.
70 On the 
topic of the  Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) (a partnership between WWF and the 
multinational corporation Unilever) a WWF representative declared in 1996:  
“the history of fisheries management is one of spectacular failure. By working 
together with progressive seafood firms, we can harness consumer power in 
support of conservation and make it easier for governments to act”.
71  
When the Commission launched its public consultation on the reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) in early 2009,
72 WWF logically saw the need for further advocacy of 
its stance towards sustainable fisheries. To maximise its chances of success, WWF then took 
the initiative to bring together all key and like-minded actors in European fisheries to form 
the ‘CFP Reform Alliance’.
73 It should be noted that some members are themselves networks 
that were invited by their own national members to join the Alliance .
74 The Alliance’s first 
                                                 
64 Hula, ‘Dolly Goes to Washington’, op. cit., p.238. 
65 Hoffman and Bertels, op. cit., pp.21-22. 
66 Covey and Brown, op. cit., p.5. 
67 C. W. Lee, ‘The Roots of Astroturfing’, Contexts, Vol.9, No.1, 2010, p.75. 
68 Leech et. al., op. cit., p.25. 
69 Interview with Murray. 
70 ‘Coalitions and their influence on EU decision-making’, EurActiv.com, 20 April 2006, updated 4 June 2012. 
71 Constance and Bonanno, loc. cit. 
72 European Commission,  Green Paper  — Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, COM(2009)163 final, 
Brussels, 22 April 2009. 
73 Interview with N. Courcy, WWF (Fisheries policy consultant), 27 February 2013, Brussels. 
74 Phone interview with M. Valverde Lopez, Eurocommerce (Food and Nutrition Adviser), 5 April 2013.   14 
statement was published on 28 April 2010 at the European Seafood Exhibition in Brussels
75 
(see Annex I). The first members were WWF, the European Fish Processors Association 
(AIPCE),  the  European  Retailers  Association  (Eurocommerce)  and  the  European 
Community of Consumer Cooperatives (Euro Coop), with the European Chefs Association 
(Euro-Toques) who joined at a later stage.
76  
The aim of such a large coalition is to show the unity of several segments of the 
production chain behind the same message:  
“industry and conservation groups have in the past not always been on the 
same side of the debate with regard to fisheries [...] but WWF and a sizeable 
portion of the industry have found that they actually agree about the need for 
an ambitious reform”.
77  
As seen in the case of the MSC, WWF is recognised by its peers as a pragmatic 
NGO: “forming alliances with industries is a typical WWF thing to do”.
78 Euro Coop, due to 
its hybrid nature of consumers and retailers representative, is also prone to dialogue and 
compromise rather than open confrontation .
79 AIPCE and Eurocommerce both represent 
many national members at the EU-level, and had the difficult task of balancing their interests 
and rivalries. A common solution was to let each individual member able to increase their 
personal involvement as far as they wanted: the German Eurocommerce member ‘Edeka’ for 
instance,  taking  advantage  of  its  “first-class  fisheries  expertise”,  in  some  instances 
represented Eurocommerce directly with decision-makers.
80 
What makes this Alliance unique is that for the first time, members concentrated on 
policy  reform  rather  than  on  individual  action s.
81 Initial  negotiations  focused  on  the 
formulation of a common basis of consensus, since it was clear that a strong message was 
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needed to be credible as an Alliance.
82 Each member set their respective red lines and began 
negotiating with the others before  obtaining the final five -axis manifesto that has been 
present on every Alliance document since then
83 (see Annex II). These five points have been 
described as rather general, but this generality is a necessary compromise to reach consensus 
among different  actors that  each need to  be accountable to  their own constituents:  “this 
compromise  is  of  course  broader  than  the  smallest  common  denominator,  which  was  a 
fundamental issue for WWF in terms of public image and credibility”.
84 On this point there 
is no agreement amongst members, since other stakeholders said that “the position is exactly 
the smallest common denominator, because when going into details the coalition was more 
limited  so  we  had  to  stick  to  the  main  principles”.
85 Furthermore, the points w here no 
consensus was reached do not necessarily signal a conflict, but potentially “matters outside 
our sphere of competence as a sector, hence the absence of stance as an Alliance”.
86  
Once the message was clearly structured around the five axes, the Alliance had to be 
set into motion to influence policy -makers. A monthly coalition meeting was organised 
between all stakeholders following the institutional schedule to discuss actions to be take n. 
After the publication of its  initial statement, the Alliance met Commission and Parliament 
representatives  to present its common strategy before organising several events between 
January and July 2011: individual meetings with M embers of the Parliament (MEPs) ; a 
roundtable with Maritime Affairs Commissioner Maria Damanaki   at  the 2011 European 
Seafood Expo; a high-level seminar in Poland focused on Baltic Member States during the 
Polish Presidency; and several networking  fish dinners in Brussels.
87 Some Alliance events 
were even hosted by the CFP reform rapporteur in the fisher ies committee, Ulrike Rodust, 
including a breakfast meeting specifically targeting the key group of German conservative 
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MEPs.
88 The Alliance furthermore organised, at key moments, mass letter campaigns .
89 In 
contrast to most transversal coalitions, the focus of the CFP Reform Alliance is not on the 
general public but on key decision-makers. The Alliance members have not appeared in the 
media, nor have they created a website or  signed up to any logo licensing .
90 This unusual 
lack of publicity can find its roots in the diversity of members.  
Without going as far as speaking of ‘mistrust’, one could speak of a certain degree of 
mutual  control  between  Alliance  members,  for  instance  in  the  lengthy  procedures  of 
unanimous approval for every written production in the name of the Alliance.
91 The partners 
being of unequal resources and backgrounds, this situation could easily have given rise to 
“confrontational  power  games”,
92  but  Alliance  partners  succeeded  in  avoiding  any 
replication of the NGO/business divide .
93 The importance of the CFP Reform Alliance is 
however put into perspective by the parliamentary assistant to MEP Rodust:  
“everyone was not aware of its existence, also because there was a lot of 
individual lobbying from each member of the coalition. The lobbying efforts 
from  the  two  NGO  coalitions  [...]  were  more  important  and  visible,  and 
therefore attracted a lot more opposition from [...] fishermen’s lobbies, and 
regional associations such as the Bretagne region”.
94 
The CFP Reform  was adopted by the Fisheries Committee of the EP on  18 June 
2013, but has yet to be adopted by the EP plenary and the Council of the EU  at the time of 
this writing. Since its proposal, it has been a fertile subject for the study of  ad hoc lobbying 
coalitions, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 - Stakeholders on the EU fisheries reform 
The  CFP  Reform  Alliance  gathers  consensus-oriented  members  from  different 
backgrounds with the aim of accomplishing an objective deemed optimal for all of them: 
guarantee the sustainability of fisheries in the EU. It is in their common interest not to see 
the fish population of Europe depleted and eventually disappear. The Alliance has neither a 
hierarchy  nor  an  official  chair—the  WWF  played  the  part  of  the  facilitator  by  drafting 
position  papers,  but  all  decisions  went  through  a  process  of  horizontal  bargaining.  The 
Alliance  is  also  quite  remarkable  insofar  as  it  became,  in  its  interaction  with  decision-
makers,  part  of  the  policy  solution  rather  than  independently  creating  a  “sustainable 
fisheries” label to put on certain products.  
In a nutshell, while the Diet Platform is a stable and permanent model steered by the 
Commission, the CFP Reform Alliance is a unique self-governed coalition purely aimed at 
influencing EU institutions. The Diet Platform and the CFP Reform Alliance, however, have 
in common their diverse membership, bringing both for-profit and not-for-profit members to 
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the same table. Through this  socialisation process,  one  can hypothesise on the potential 
integrative effect of these collaborative patterns. 
 
2. Why choose collaboration over confrontation? 
The  main  question  of  this  section  is  to  assess  whether  the  gains  obtained  by  joining  a 
transversal partnership such as the Diet Platform or the CFP Reform Alliance are worth the 
sacrifices  and  loss  of  autonomy.  How  do  EU  institutions  take  into  account  the  inputs 
produced by multi-stakeholder networks in its governance, and what differences does the 
adoption of transversal collaborative behaviours make? 
 Access to institutions 
The objective of interest groups is to have their voices heard by EU institutions; to 
this end, they first and foremost need access to said institutions. What are the factors that 
help transversal coalitions and platforms improve their access to EU institutions? 
Stakeholders being rational actors, their decisions are based on cost/benefit analyses: 
the rationale behind collaborative behaviours is that an optimal outcome will follow.
95 By 
coming together, stakeholders pool their strengths in order to transform businesses’ expertise 
and consumer groups’ credibility into improved access to EU institutions so as to give their 
common message more leverage.
96 The mere fact of being part of a transversal coalition or 
platform confers an image of trustworthiness, as the actor is perceived as  consensus- and 
dialogue-oriented,  in  accordance  with  the  EU  negotiation  culture .
97  Moreover,  such 
coalitions introduce  ready-made consensuses: instead of being part of the problem they 
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establish  themselves  as  part  of  the  solution.
98 Logically,  transversal  co alitions  should 
therefore benefit from an improved access to institutions. In the case of the CFP Reform 
Alliance,  “decisions-makers  like  the  Commission  are  clearly  impressed  by  this  level  of 
policy  co-operation  between  stakeholders  across  seafood  sectors,  countries  and  interest 
groups, which they have not seen to date”.
99 It also helps to defend the same policy goal as 
the institution,
100 which in the case of the CFP reform is sustainable fisheries .
101 In short, 
“getting access to [institutions] can be quite difficult, and a coalition makes this easier”.
102 
Some nuances should, however, be brought to this overly simplistic picture. Representatives 
of  the  CFP  Reform  Alliance  members  were  asked  to  assess  their  common  access  to 
institutions as compared to their indiv idual access, and more complex results emerged . It 
transpired that all the Alliance members were already respected organisations in Brussels; it 
is therefore not a question of ‘improved access’, but undoubtedly of ‘improved reception’. 
The notion of ‘access’ is therefore not as relevant as that of ‘reception’ in the case of the 
CFP Reform Alliance: having a strong message ensures better listening from partners and 
institutions.
103 The WWF representative  introduced  a surprising caveat:  “the  alliance  is 
undoubtedly efficient, but in some particular situations we had a worse access than if we had 
lobbied alone, due to decision-makers’ cautiousness when speaking to such a wide range of 
interests”.
104 Even so, the simple study of a coalition’s features is not sufficient when dealing 
with  access  to  EU  institutions  insofar  as  they  each  have  their  own  cultures,  needs  and 
tensions influencing their receptiveness to external input. 
Each  EU  institution,  and  within  them  sub-groups  such  as  DGs  or  parliamentary 
groups  or  committees,  is  subject  to  its  own  unique  dynamics.  The  first  variable 
                                                 
98 Interview with Patten and with Reußner. 
99 Interview with Courcy. 
100 Leech et. al., op. cit., p.7. 
101 M.  Damanaki,  quoted  in:  European  Commission,  ‘Maria  Damanaki  at  European  Seafood  Exposition: 
Driving the Reform forward’, press release, 24 April 2012. 
102 Email interview with K. Stack, parliamentary assistant  to MEP Struan Stevenson (rapporteur on the 
Common Market Organisation regulation), 16 April 2013. 
103 Interview with Valverde Lopez and with Veale. 
104 Interview with Courcy.   20 
differentiating  the  institutions  is  their  degree  of  accountability:  the  less  electorally 
accountable a policy-maker is, the less responsive it will be to stakeholders’ pressure.
105  
The second variable is the specific need of an institution: some institutions favour 
groups that can provide them with the technical expertise they need, while some others may 
prefer groups able to mobilise masses, or to influence macro -economic dynamics.
106 From 
this  perspective, the main advantage in terms of access of a transversal coalition is the 
possibility  of  ‘institution-shopping’,  meaning  pooling  together  each  member’s  traditional 
channels of influence in order to build a larger institutional support base.
107 In more practical 
terms, one could, for instance, expect within the Commission to see DGs focused on the 
environment or consumers closer to NGOs, and DGs dealing with the Single Market, 
industry or competition being friendlier with industrial groups .
108 The role of policy fora 
such as the Diet Platform in guaranteeing institutional access to its members is relatively 
subtle, as they are not linked to a particular issue but a general policy field. However,  
“[forum  politics] raised the influence of business  in  the power politics  of 
inter-Director General rivalry, and has given them quasi-policymaking and 
agenda-setting status in certain strategic areas [...] Competition between DGs 
encouraged the creation of forums and networks [given that] it provided the 
individual  Commissioners  with  their  own  political  and  economic 
constituencies within Brussels”.
109  
While DG SANCO is responsible for the Diet Platform, calls for the involvement of 
other departments and DG Research in particular have emerged .
110 The choice of a leading 
DG for any platform has important consequences. The CFP Reform Alliance, formed during 
the Commission’s public consultation phase, had limited contact with the Commission given 
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that  they  basically  agreed  on  the  same  policy  goals.
111 A more complex set of   actors 
challenged the Alliance members in the Parlia ment; this institution is structurally the most 
receptive to environmental groups,
112 and part of the Alliance’s opposition is composed of 
environmental  NGOs.  The  Alliance’s  objective,  quite  uniquely,  is  not  to  advertise  its 
position with the media or the broader public, but to focus on decision-makers to have its 
voice  heard.
113 This  low  public  profile  was  also  helpful  in  the  Alliance’s  effort  not  to 
antagonise  any  of  its  members’  traditional  interlocutors  with  discourses  that  are  too 
iconoclastic. In short, stakeholders tried to establish dialogue with all MEPs, not sharing 
them  between  different  Alliance  partners.
114 However, when concretely lobbying MEPs, 
WWF mainly succeeded in establishing dialogue with the left-wing parties, and its economic 
partners with the liberals and conservatives.
115 It was nevertheless not too strict a separation, 
as  other  factors  such  as  the  MEP’s  position  within  the  fisheries  committee  and  their 
nationality also played a significant role alongside their political sympathies.
116 
The parallel between the Diet Platform and the CFP Reform Alliance on the issue of 
access to institutions is challenging, as the former is by definition permanent and therefore 
not linked with specific legislation. However, one can try to compare their strengths and 
weaknesses in order to achieve a more balanced picture of the situation. 
On the one hand, an ad hoc coalition offers inherent advantages over any other type 
of  policy  platform:  focused  on  a  single  issue,  it  is  therefore  a  lot  easier  to  identify  the 
stakeholders’ common interests and concentrate political resources on them.
117 Coalitions 
are also more flexible, more autonomous, more reactive and more creative: they are better 
adapted  to  the  unpredictable  style  of  EU  politics  and  the  issue -bound  character  of 
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negotiations.
118 Finally, as far as a group’s internal dynamics are concerned, coalitions are 
less likely to contain free riders since every single member is needed and therefore visible.
119  
On the other hand, policy platforms also have strengths that issue networks do not 
possess. First of all, they are permanent fora, which means that when an issue of interest 
arises members of the platform can begin lobbying straightaway while ad hoc coalitions are 
only created after the issues become clearer, and they are also time-consuming to create and 
manage.
120 Parallel to their higher free -rider rate, platforms also have a lower ‘opting-out 
threshold’ than coalitions, as the latter is an unstable, fragile and opportunistic model with no 
long-term  commitment  or  guarantees,  higher  transaction  costs  and  high  dependency  on 
immediate rewards to survive.
121 In this perspective, Figures 2 and 3 apply this comparative 
framework to the concrete examples of the CFP Reform Alliance and the Diet Platform. 
 
Figure 1 - SWOT Analysis of the CFP Reform Alliance 
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Figure 2 - SWOT Analysis of the Diet Platform 
In  conclusion,  the  hypothesis  of  a  transversal  coalition  or  platform  automatically 
receiving better access to EU institutions has to be nuanced. At best, stakeholders receive not  
better access but a better reception, given that decision-makers would have listened to them 
even if they had formed traditional coalitions or had opted for individual lobbying. Factors 
external to coalitions and internal to institutions also have to be taken into account, such as 
each institution’s culture, needs, particularities and traditional dialogue partners. Institutions 
are also keen on taking civil society’s input into consideration in order to improve their own 
democratic credentials and deliver better governance to European citizens. 
What added legitimacy? 
To understand what legitimacy civil society fora can bring to the EU through their 
participation, it is necessary to question their own internal legitimacy. The Diet Platform is 
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institutions) 
- risk of paralysis on divisive 
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frequently divided by debates among members about its organisation and the efficiency of 
voluntary approaches.
122 On the one hand, part of academia and of the NGO members of the 
Platform believe that public regulation is the only efficient model to manage commodity 
industries,
123 and given that the Diet Platform heavily relies on self -regulation, “there is no 
evidence to support their effectiveness or safety”.
124 On the other hand, the business part of 
the  Diet  Platform  membership  is,  logically,  more  optimistic  about  the  Platform’s 
achievements.
125  From  a  more  general  perspective,  policy  platforms  also  enable  the 
production of counter-expertise, best practice studies and informed d ebate over policies in 
the making; they “become part of the system of checks and balances [...] networks may be 
producing their own system of mutual control”.
126 In short, network governance such as the 
Diet Platform can also involve more actors in civil soc iety consultation in a context of 
waning citizen participation;
127 however it does not represent an alternative to traditional 
democratic accountability.
128 For the Commission, resorting to network governance is only a 
tool among many alternative collaborative approaches such as high-level groups or online 
consultations.
129 
In an  ad hoc coalition such as the CFP Reform Alliance, members take political 
stances that go further than the commitments of the Diet Platform; stakeholders therefore 
need to engage in a difficult exercise of balancing their commitments within the Alliance 
with their members’ expectations. Legitimacy in this context consists of a ‘social contract’ 
between an association and its members, the ‘social contract’ being defined by expectations 
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about the association’s operations.
130 Consequently, failure to respect the ‘social contract’ 
will result in sanctions such as loss of legitimacy and representation rights.
131 Compromises 
are, however, necessary to reach second-best scenarios when an optimal outco me is not 
foreseeable.  This  applies  first   at  the  policy  drafting  stage ,  but  even  more   during  the 
subsequent  legislative procedure.
132 This difference of weigh t  given  to  an  organisation’s 
radicalism  or  pragmatism  depends  on  each  organisation’s  internal  culture  and  needs,  as 
mentioned in the previous part.  
In summary, the sphere of action of platforms being limited to policy commitments 
and public debate, the different actors mainly respect traditional cleavages. In doing so, they 
act  according  with  their  members’  expectations,  thereby  not  endangering  their  internal 
legitimacy. Belonging to a coalition, in contrast, demands compromises and negotiation with 
external partners, hence there are risks of exceeding the ‘social contract’. The trademark of 
‘transversal  collaborative  behaviours’  is  the  occurrence  of  iterative  socialisation  with 
representatives  of  traditionally  antagonistic  groups.  Does  this  socialisation  lead  to 
transformative processes? 
 Added value of collaboration 
All too often, commentators of EU politics use the ‘David vs. Goliath’ analogy when 
describing  the  poor  situation  citizens’  groups  find  themselves  in.  Citizens’  groups  have 
indeed  been  known  to  frustrate  EU  policy-makers  by  failing  to  deliver  mobilisation,  by 
following individual goals, by often being unwilling to compromise, and by lacking the 
necessary expertise for highly technical issues.
133 Further, the influence of citizens’ groups is 
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dependent on “the vicissitudes of the ‘issue attention cycle’ and public popular support”.
134 
In this context, business groups indeed seem to be the feared ‘Goliath’ advantaged by nature 
to win the struggle for political influence.
135 However, an actor’s weakness can also become 
its strength: EU institutions are aware of the resource limitation of citizens’ groups, and as a 
consequence “when they do lobby they are more likely to be considered as an important 
actor”.
136 Furthermore, citizens’ groups’ role may be given increased visibility by journalists 
covering the story as they can provide a sober political negotiation with some underdog 
perspective  and  controversy.
137 Instances of co-operation  between  citizens’  groups  and 
business representations therefore have the potential to bring out the best in both partners 
and  consequently  deliver  more  than  under  a  traditional  confrontational  scenario.
138 
Partnerships between for-profits and not-for-profits are also valued by citizens who favour 
both strong economic results and the protection of  their values.
139 Likewise, EU institutions 
will favour coalitions as they considerably facilitate their work of building a support base.
140  
Along those objective gains from network membership, some subjective evolutions 
also take place among partners. For instance, the success of a transversal lobbying campaign 
with  organisations  that  traditio nally  were  antagonistic  will  modify  a  stakeholder’s 
knowledge, hence “alterations of thought or behavioral intentions”.
141 Successful partnership 
experience increases an actor’s integrative skills
142 through a long learning process. Those 
coalitions also enable involved stakeholders to adopt a more pro-active style of lobbying and 
to  propose  solutions.
143  Evolving  towards  such  a  consensus -oriented  stance  can  be 
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interpreted as a step in establishing a ‘European identity’ and obtain a greater weight with 
institutions by adopting the EU style of negotiation.
144 In concrete cases, the efficiency of 
such a learning process depends on the success of the partnership. In the case of a failure, the 
learning process can effectively deter stakeholders from further alliances with other actors.  
The efficiency of the Diet Platform is contested, with a clear divide between the 
generally satisfied business population and the highly critical not -for-profit members.
145 
Belonging to the Diet  Platform in itself does not encourage   members  to pursue more 
intensive bilateral relationship with former antagonistic stakeholders, nor do members lobby 
for the creation of other multi-stakeholders policy platforms on other topics in the future. In 
this understanding, the ‘learning process’ of the Diet Platform is limited. The case of the 
CFP Reform Alliance is quite different, in the sense that no explicit or implicit pressure was 
imposed on stakeholders that freely chose to commit themselves to the coalition. The lack of 
institutional involvement let stakeholders have more choice in the features of their coalition, 
its  activities  and  development  perspectives.  As  a  consequence,  the  representatives  of 
Eurocommerce and of AIPCE both describe their experience in the CFP Reform Alliance as 
a ‘learning experience’
146 or ‘learning process’
147 despite intense negotiations, even going as 
far as declaring “our organisation is very open to other similar alliances in the future, of 
course depending on the issue at stake”.
148 
This point of view depicting strategically-minded coalition partners — industries as 
well as NGOs — goes not only against the ‘David vs. Goliath’ popular conception, but also 
against the somewhat naïve idea of former antagonists suddenly trusting each other for the 
greater public interest of sustainable fisheries. One should therefore not draw too optimistic a 
conclusion about a bright future of consensus-based civil society dialogue, but on the other 
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hand one cannot ignore the genuine learning process born out of integration and reinforced 
by cybernetics. 
By way of conclusion, one can only draw a more nuanced picture of the original idea 
that transversal partnerships would automatically guarantee stakeholders more leverage on 
institutions. While this is not per se wrong — decision-makers appreciate the pro-active 
behaviour of consensus-builders — other independent factors have to be taken into account. 
The more integrated a network becomes, the more diplomatic skills are required to juggle 
each stakeholder’s leeway within the coalition, and its obligations to its national members. 
Stakeholders in less integrated fora take fewer risks in terms of national members’ trust and 
expectations, but their legitimacy can just as easily be questioned in case of insufficient 
results.  Finally,  successful  results  can  also  trigger  a  self-fuelling  circle  of  integration 
favouring future collaborative behaviour.  
 
3. A promising future? 
It appears obvious that transversal coalition-forming “is not a model to be replicated blindly, 
but rather one that is worth exploring of a case-by-case basis”.
149 In these conditions, how 
could one describe the optimal conditions for them to emerge?  
The first set of conditions relies on the  features of the coalition’s membership. A 
coalition has to balance two factors: (i) the more representative it is, the more leverage it will 
have on decision-makers, but (ii) the larger it is, the more difficult it will be to operate. The 
optimum would therefore be “to privilege quality and not the quantity of members, as soon 
as a certain threshold of credibility is reached”.
150 A limited number of members with whom 
a trust link can be created provides a better basis for integration and effective common 
action. Previous experience and the perception of influence both play a significant role in the 
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decision to join a coalition.
151 It can. However, be difficult to establish trust links strong 
enough  to  overcome  previously  antagonistic  relationships  in  the  case  of  a  transversal 
coalition, as “the relationships are much more sensitive, the views of the membership are 
much less predictable, and the compatibility of the interests are much more fragile”.
152 The 
privileged solution for these trust issues is to encourage intensive socialisation and daily 
contacts between partners in order to establish mutual trust and g uarantees of loyalty.
153 By 
focusing on immediate goals, partners can therefore develop trust links while postponing 
second-level trust issues.
154. 
A synergy of interests is the sine qua non condition for coalition building: “if there is 
no existing common basis, stakeholders will not begin negotiating just to build it”.
155 The 
pragmatism  of  stakeholders   allows  a  multiplicity  of  surprising  coalitions,  including 
transversal advocacy networks. In order to build larger  — even though less integrated — 
coalitions, stakeholders can also choose to settle not for commonality of interests, but for 
compatibility of interests, the latter being less exclusive to potential partners.
156 In this line of 
thought, issues on which traditional  coalitions are divided provide  fertile ground for new 
transversal coalitions.
157 For instance, on some issues the main divide is not between 
citizens’  groups  and  businesses,  but  between  multinational  corporations  and  small 
enterprises, in which case, the more pragmatic citizens’ groups are free to form a coalition 
with either one of the business groups that has similar policy goals.
158 The key to coalition 
building is to take advantage of the diversity of represented interests.
159 
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The  EU  institutions’  position  is  instrumental  in  determining  the  success  of  a 
coalition. According to the notion of ‘institutional stickiness’, an advocacy campaign will be 
smoother, less divisive and more successful  if  it defends  the  status  quo.
160 Furthermore, 
some  characteristics  relating  to  the  issue  at  stake  are  important  variables  that  raise  the 
probability of coalitions emerging. First of all is the saliency of an issue: in order to obtain 
satisfying  outcomes  stakeholders  will  have  to  attract  the  media’s  attention  with  creative 
solutions.
161 The scope of an issue plays an imp ortant role too, given that the larger the 
scope, the more citizens are concerned and as a consequence the stronger advocates have to 
appear to win the EU institutions’ support.
162 Finally, the life cycle of an issue also has to be 
considered: coalitions are more likely to be created on short and decisive debates rather than 
extended and in-depth discussions that could put at risk the unity of the coalition.
163 
Opposite sides struggle for institutional influence on nearly all EU -level debates. 
Stakeholders have to adapt to their opposition in order to win this  power  struggle. The 
stronger and more organised the opposition is perceived, the more likely it is that threatened 
stakeholders are going to form a strategic coalition.
164 This is all the more relevant when the 
opposition itself has opted for a coalition on the same policy issues .
165 To reinforce their 
chances, stakeholders will then try to outbid their opposition by joining forces. However if 
the opposition were perceived as divided, stakeholders would not have the same incentive to 
compromise their maximal individual outcome for a common preferred outcome. 
Once the coalition is formed, it has to survive in a very competitive environment . 
From a logistics perspective, the potential for explosion of a transversa l coalition will be 
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greatly  reduced  if  the  chosen  ‘coalition  pilot’  is  autonomous  and  independent  from  the 
coalition’s  members,  as  this  ‘pilot’  will  become  the  trusted  honest  broker  charged  of 
diffusing internal tensions.
166 In the case of the CFP Reform All iance for instance, WWF 
took  the  initiative  and  consequently  assumed  the  ‘pilot’  role,  but  always  in  constant 
communication with its partners in order to build mutual trust and loyalty.
167 From a more 
general point of view, to be successful a coalition needs  to establish a clear strategy and 
long-term relations with the institutions in order to anticipate change and new proposals.
168 
In  abstracto,  the  optimal  conditions  for  a  transversal  coalition  to  appear  and  be 
successful would be coalition-seasoned partners with a common interest in a policy outcome 
that would come together along trust-building carefully studied logistics, preferably on a 
highly salient, all-encompassing and momentous policy with an uncertain outcome due to 
powerful and organised opposition. However, many limits impede a generalisation of such 
collaborative partnerships, or the long-term survival of the existing ad hoc coalitions. 
Limits to the model 
Observers  of  the  EU  advocacy  environment  must  not  take  an  analytical  shortcut 
when studying transversal coalitions and treat them as an end in themselves instead of a 
means  to  an  end.
169  Collaborative  partnerships  are  nothing  but  the  result  of  each 
stakeholder’s cost/gain analysis in order to reach an optimal policy outcome. They do not 
represent a panacea for all advocacy challenges, as they can be divisive, unstable, incoherent 
and  inefficient  depending  on  the  policy  area  and  the  members  involved.  Firstly,  as 
mentioned previously on the topic of astroturfing, window-dressing and entrenched distrust, 
some ‘dark green’ citizens’ groups and some ‘dark blue’ business  groups  are hostile on 
principle to bridging the for-profit/not-for-profit gap. Second is the instability of transversal 
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coalitions  because  of  dormant  internal  divides  and  consequent  “confrontational  power 
games”.
170 Such coalitions  not only involve the partner stakeholders, but also their own 
national members, thereby creating a wide and complex set of involved parties .
171 Such 
instability is accompanied by a risk of incoherence: th e capacity of  going into detail  is 
limited in transversal coalitions,
172 especially on polemic issues.
173 Coalition members have 
to preserve at all costs their coherence and avoid internal contradictions, as the potential 
losses  are  as  important  as  the potential  gains .
174 Finally,  the efficiency  of  transversal 
coalitions as advocacy instruments can be questioned by the heavy transaction cost involved. 
Indeed, while an already operative coalition can be very reactive and dynamic, the building 
of a coalition is very time-consuming when in interest representation timing is everything.
175 
Furthermore, transversal coalitions do not systematically contribute in proposing innovative 
solutions: while the advocacy form they adopt is quite pioneering, their policy positions tend 
on the contrary to defend the status quo.
176 
From this comparison of the optimal conditions and parallel caveats of transversal 
coalition-building, it appears that only a case-by-case analysis can be useful in determining if 
a collaborative partnership is the right advocacy choice for an interest group. It appears that 
the model of coalition building can only occur on specific issues and for limited amounts of 
time.
177 The policy field of fisheries, in the case study of the CFP Reform Alliance, is quite 
specific as the interests of citizens’ groups and businesses matched on some points.
178 Such 
commonality of interests is often the case with process values such as ‘sustainability’ as 
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opposed to content values that demand quantified goals or results, and are in consequence 
much more difficult to agree upon.
179 The idea of co-operation between antagonist groups 
has been ‘oversold’ with a lot of “hype and enthusiasm”,
180 which may give the idea that 
such coalitions are rife, but in reality they are more the exception than the rule .
181 In short, 
while there is no denial that some successful transversal coalitions exist and that the concept 
has a lot of potential, in Brussels they remain for now “isolated pioneers”.
182 
Parallel solutions 
By definition, stakeholders united in an ad hoc coalition defend a common basis of 
interests together; their own individual interests nevertheless overflow from this common 
basis. On the case of the CFP Reform Alliance, each member pursued parallel individual 
lobbying  on  the  topics  where  no  consensus  could  be  found
183 and WWF for instance 
belonged to two different coalitions on the CFP reform .
184 The Alliance only defends some 
general points  on the  CFP Reform, while  regulation tackles the core business of some 
Alliance members that in consequence had to engage into individual lobbying in order to 
have their specific interests heard.
185 In the case of such a special interest, the representatives 
of an individual stakeholder would  directly interact with decision-makers,
186 and never go 
against the Alliance’s common stance.
187 This precaution is essential in order to safeguard 
the coherence of the Alliance and each of its components. WWF  for instance needed to be 
extremely  clear in its interactions with decision -makers because of its double coalition 
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membership as well as optional individual lobbying, but seemingly it succeeded in doing so 
without creating too much confusion or additional problems.
188  
When stakeholders do not want to compromise even an  inch of their independence, 
they are free to resort to other collaborative behaviours that do not necessitate formalisation 
and leaves them more room for manoeuvre. While these informal solutions do not have the 
same advantages in terms of public image, their flexibility makes them more widespread at 
EU-level. Contrary to some misconceptions, co-operation between stakeholders is not a n 
“all-or-none process”
189 but on the contrary it “involves a fairly broad zone of transition”.
190 
Without creating a real coalition, alternatives include the publication of joint press releases, 
or even the organisation of joint events , according to the stakeholders’ specific needs.
191 
More  informal  options  include  the  co -ordination  of  events,  or  finally  exchanges  of 
intelligence:  “BEUC  got  more  documents  and  data  from  industries  than  from  the  EU 
institutions”.
192 
In conclusion, building transversal coalitions is only one of the many options interest 
groups can choose to advocate their point of view to decision-makers. Under a specific set of 
circumstances, it appears to be the most effective strategy, but   as every strategy  it  has 
weaknesses. It is therefore impossible to elaborate ground rules about the generalisation of 
transversal coalitions, the only relevant assessment being a case-by-case analysis.  
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Conclusion 
The objective of this paper has been to assess the rationale behind the creation of transversal 
partnerships, and how stakeholders could concretely put their antagonism to the side while 
working together. It was hypothesised in the introduction that (i) transversal coalitions were 
formed  based  on  their  success  in  other  policy  fields;  (ii)  that  they  generated  a  learning 
process and that (iii) they resulted in an improved influence on EU institutions. 
 On hypothesis (i), while the success of such initiatives in other policy fields may 
have accustomed certain actors to the idea of transversal coalitions, the particularities of food 
policy make the blind replication of such models impossible. It appears from the two case 
studies  in  particular  that  the  rationale  behind  the  adoption  of  collaborative  partnerships 
comes instead from a case-by-case cost/gain analysis leading to hopes of improved access to 
institutions and of a more positive image towards external actors such as the media and the 
general public. On hypothesis (ii), membership of a collaborative network indeed leads to a 
learning  process,  but  one  should  add  that  this  learning  process  is  closely  linked  to  the 
network’s performance and is thus not automatically positive. Finally, on hypothesis (iii), 
coalitions can have a better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending 
on  external  and  internal  factors  that  are  completely  independent  from  the  stakeholders 
themselves.  
A final caveat, both for the Diet Platform and for the CFP Reform Alliance, is that 
observers should not adopt too naïve a posture and consider that stakeholders unite out of 
idealism: for stakeholders, collaboration is nothing but a means that has been pragmatically 
calculated as the most beneficial to reach a certain political end. One therefore should not 
expect a sudden generalisation of such collaborative behaviours, but look out for situations 
in  which  the  optimal  conditions  are  met.  One  of  these  ideal  conditions  being  previous 
collaborative behaviour, subsequent to this work it would be interesting to follow in the near   36 
future  the  lobbying  strategies  chosen  by  stakeholders  involved  in  the  case  studies.  This 
transformative  process,  less  revolutionary  than  originally  expected,  could  lead  to  a  very 
gradual increase of collaboration, still far away from any generalisation at the EU-level.   37 
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EUROCOMMERCE  représente  le  commerce  de  détail,  de  gros  et  international  en  Europe.  EuroCommerce 
compte  parmi  ses  membres des  fédérations  du  commerce  dans  31 pays,  des associations européennes et 
nationales représentant des branches spécifiques du commerce ainsi que des entreprises à titre individuel. 
Marina Valverde Lopez, +32 2 737 0584 
valverdelopez@eurocommerce.be 
www.eurocommerce.be  
 
EURO COOP ou la Communauté européenne des coopératives de consommateurs représente les intérêts des 
coopératives de consommateurs de l'UE, représentant 300.000 salariés, 30.000 points de vente et 29 millions 
de consommateurs‐membres à travers 17 pays. 
www.eurocoop.coop   
 
EURO‐TOQUES  INTERNATIONAL,  la  Communauté  européenne  des  cuisiniers,  est  une  organisation 
paneuropéenne créée en 1986 qui représente plus de 2000 Chefs cuisiniers, avec des branches nationales dans 
17 pays européens. 
Amélie Empereur, +32 2 506 8834 
Amelie.Empereur@euralia.eu 
www.euro‐toques.org 
 
WWF  est  l'un  des  organismes  de  conservation  indépendants  les  plus  importants  et  les  plus  respectés  du 
monde, avec près de 5 millions de sympathisants et un réseau mondial actif dans plus de 100 pays. 
Nils Courcy, +32 2 740 0924  
ncourcy@wwf.eu 
www.wwf.eu  
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